Tuesday, July 9, 2024

A Debatable Word: Defining ‘Atheism’

Among both philosophers and non-philosophers, the word ‘atheism’ appears in a variety of different types of text. It is uttered in conversations, lectures, and debates. Many readers or listeners have strong and passionate reactions to this word — pleasant or otherwise. Nearly everyone who uses the word believes that he or she knows what it means — or what he or she means by it.

An analysis of this word’s use reveals that its significance is not so obvious.

It is not, e.g., a synonym for ‘irreligious’ or ‘antireligious’ — as is clear from the existence of many theists who are both antireligious and irreligious.

A lucid and intelligible definition of ‘atheism’ is needed. Many words have more than one definition. If ‘atheism’ has more than one definition, then what is most needed is the definition which will serve to clarify philosophical analysis. The word may have other definitions which circulate in the non-philosophical word, but they are of no import.

It would be reasonable to propose that ‘atheism’ be defined as primarily an ontological word. The word is used when discussing whether or not a certain object exists, and that object is usually labeled ‘God.’ This type of definition raises the question of how ‘God’ is defined, and so puts off or postpones the question. Yet, despite the fact that this definition merely delays, and doesn’t directly solve, the situation, it still has a certain merit, because it directs attention to the question of whether or not something exists.

Like ‘atheism,’ the word ‘God,’ tends to be informally associated with various passions and experiences — pleasant or painful. The word ‘God’ may precipitate or prompt — or “trigger” — memories of encounters with organized religion or spiritual texts. It might be helpful to use synonyms: a ‘higher power’ or a ‘deity’ or another word can serve, as can circumlocutions like ‘unmoved mover’ or ‘that which must necessarily be’ or ‘prime mover’ or ‘prime cause.’

The question of existence is central in the word ‘atheism.’ This question is often lost in various side-issues which are tangential to a discussion of atheism.

It must be stated explicitly that a discussion of atheism is not a discussion of religion, and that these two discussions are quite separate. Religion is a socio-cultural artifact: a civilization’s response to whichever possible answer — or answers — the civilization has proposed to the question of atheism.

It is a recurrent mistake to label someone as an atheist merely because she or he directs a profound, impassioned, and accurate critique of religious institutions. A person can find a particular religion, or religion in general, to be wrong, dangerous, and repulsive without being an atheist. Often, the most intense critique of religion is delivered by those whose belief in God is equally intense.

The question of atheism, as a simple ontological question, would still be a reasonable question in a universe in which no human being existed — and in a universe which was also otherwise unpopulated. A question of the form “Does a certain object X exist?” is a simple question and is often — always? — reasonable to ask. The question is independent of any psychological or cultural traditions which a civilization may have formed around the concept of object X — whether or not it exists.

Whether one be “for” or “against” atheism, it is necessary that one isolate the question of atheism from any discussion or exploration of organized religion. Religion is ultimately a human institution. For the theist, religion is a response — and here the theist may label it a correct or an incorrect response — to the existence of God. For the atheist, religion is a construct which makes reference to a non-existent object.

The most insightful critique of religion, or even the rejection of religion altogether, is not equivalent to atheism. Some of the harshest criticisms of religion come from committed theists.

Conversely, there are atheists who are quite fond of religion.

It is possible, and in point of fact has happened, that people who work within religious institutions and who hold titles like priest, rabbi, imam, preacher, pastor, minister, etc., are in fact atheists, despite their affection for the spiritual organization in which they carry out their daily duties.

Refining the definition of ‘atheism’ can help to expose fallacies. To identify atheism with a critique of religion is a common mistake; more than one freshman has been heard to say “I’m an atheist because I hate going to church.” A variation on this fallacy is to label anyone who attacks orthodoxy as an atheist; this has in fact happened among those who work in the academic discipline of the History of Ideas.

Rigorously applied, a clarified definition of ‘atheism’ might yield some surprises: those often considered atheists might be theists, and those regarded as theists might be atheists.